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Abstract
After 14 years of unconscionable wrath against local civilians, including enforced 
recruitment of thousands of child soldiers, the rebel group The Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”)
was offered amnesty by the Ugandan government in 2000.  However, as the conflict continued 
unabated, the Ugandan government, for the first time in the history of the Court, referred its case 
to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).  The ICC Prosecutor announced the beginning of an 
investigation and issued warrants for seven top LRA officers in October of 2005.  The potential 
ICC prosecution raises many questions about the jurisdiction of the new court, including whether 
the Court should defer to national amnesty programs.  Some experts argue that a rigid criminal 
prosecution can prolong a conflict, exacerbates the suffering of the country’s citizens, and 
diminishes the value of future amnesties as peace-building tools.  Critics of amnesties, on the 
other hand, contend that honoring amnesties promotes a culture of impunity and contravenes the 
obligation of states to prosecute perpetrators of serious international crimes.  This Comment
holds that although Uganda’s amnesty act falls short of the complementarity requirements of 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, an analysis of its shortcomings illuminates how a post-conflict 
state under amnesty legislation can structure an amnesty program that may satisfy Rome Statute 
requirements.  Accordingly, this tradegy presents an opportunity for the ICC and Ugandans to 
create a template for national amnesty programs, in conjunction with truth commissions, that 
could both honor the state obligation to prosecute grave crimes while simultaneously preserving
the integrity of future amnesty grants.
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2Introduction
In 1788 Alexander Hamilton wrote:
“In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-
timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the 
commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible 
afterwards to recall.”1
Hamilton’s words assert the value of amnesties in internal conflicts.2 Over 200 years 
later, however, granting amnesties is considerably more complex; with the passage of the Rome 
Statute, national amnesties now must withstand international legal scrutiny.3
The Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”), a rebel group belonging to the Acholi tribe of 
northern Uganda, has waged a brutal war against the Ugandan government for almost 20 years.4
The LRA’s political beginnings date from 1986, after a five-year guerilla war between the 
ethnically-divided north and south, when a southern president, Yoweri Museveni, took power.5
As the country’s power shifted dramatically to the south, Museveni’s call for all Acholi soldiers
to report to the barracks aroused suspicion, causing many Acholi to flee north into Sudan to form
an armed resistance against the government in power.6
During nineteen years of wrath, the LRA committed countless atrocities against the 
civilian population of northern Uganda, including torture and mutilation, abduction, sexual 
violence, forced recruitment, and murder of suspected government supporters.7  The LRA also 
has engaged in widespread abduction of children; some estimate that LRA rebels have abducted 
more than 20,000 children, forcing boys to fight as soldiers and girls to serve as sex slaves.8
This campaign of terror resulted in over 1.6 million internally displaced persons who now inhabit
squalid and dangerous shantytowns.9
In an effort to quell the violence, the Ugandan government passed the Amnesty Act in 
January of 2000.10 Many considered the amnesty program a success because it encouraged more 
3than 15,000 rebels to surrender by June 2005.11 The conflict, however, continued to rage,12
leading to Uganda’s referral to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), pursuant to Article 14 
of the Rome Statute.13 On July 29, 2004, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo found a 
reasonable basis to investigate Joseph Kony, the LRA’s self-proclaimed spiritual leader, and 
other LRA officers.14 In response, Acholi leaders, fearing that the investigation and possible 
prosecution would aggravate the peace process, traveled to The Hague to plead with the ICC to 
suspend investigations.15 Nevertheless, on October 14, 2005, the ICC issued warrants for the 
arrest of Kony and six other top LRA leaders.16
Uganda’s ICC referral raises critical questions concerning when the Court should defer to 
national prosecutions, truth and reconciliation campaigns, and amnesty programs.17 Some legal 
scholars argue that an unrelenting insistence on criminal prosecution where there is an amnesty 
in place prolongs a conflict, exacerbates the suffering of the country’s citizens, aggravates the 
community’s healing and educational needs, and diminishes the value of future amnesties as 
peace-building tools.18 Critics of national amnesties respond that honoring amnesties promotes a 
culture of impunity – effectively “send[ing] a message” to potential brutal regime l eaders that 
they have nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures against their own populations.19
Textually, the Rome Statute does not foreclose the possibility of deferring to amnesties 
and alternative justice mechanisms when they are in the “interests of justice.”20  However, 
although customary international law does not yet forbid amnesty grants for international 
crimes,21 it appears to be moving in this direction.22 Because the ICC has yet to adjudicate upon 
the tension between its jurisdiction and a national amnesty grant, the efforts of the Prosecutor 
and the Court in Uganda will likely have potent ramifications in future ICC cases. 23
4Part I of this comment explores the effectiveness and legitimacy of prior amnesty 
programs,24 discusses the basic structure of the Ugandan Amnesty Act,25 and provides an 
overview to provisions of the Rome Statute that implicate national amnesty programs.26  Part II 
attempts to reconcile the justice interests of the Rome Statue and the practical goals of the 
Ugandan amnesty.27  Part III offers recommendations for prosecuting perpetrators in the 
Ugandan conflict while preserving the integrity of amnesties, thereby building a viable precedent
for future cases.28
I. Background
A.  Pre-ICC International Jurisprudence
While international treaty law seems to necessitate criminal prosecutions for certain 
serious crimes,29 it also appears to provide legal encouragement for amnesties in certain 
contexts.30 The legitimacy of national amnesties under customary international law is equally
ambiguous and vigorously debated.31  Thus, analysis of past judicial oversight of national 
amnesties provides needed guidance in future cases.
1. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) illustrated t he 
instrumental value of amnesties in the truth-discovery process.32 The South African government 
authorized the TRC’s Amnesty Committee to grant amnesty to perpetrators who had provided 
full disclosure of the facts of their crimes.33  Widely acclaimed for its success in providing 
national reconciliation, the TRC amnesty program proved to be an valuable mechanism in 
determining responsibility for human rights abuses.34 Two features of the TRC amnesty grant 
were crucial to its success:  it was granted conditionally and only on the basis of individualized 
application.35
52. The Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Lomé Amnesty Act
In 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone held that the amnesty 
provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement cannot deprive an international court, such as the 
Special Court, of jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes.36 Therefore, Sierra 
Leone could not legally declare an amnesty for “crimes under international law that are subject
of universal jurisdiction.”37 Notably, the Appeals Chamber declared that granting amnesty is a
“breach of an obligation of the State towards the international community as a whole.”38
3. Mitigating Sentencing Factors of the ICTY and ICTR
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) developed sentencing factors which may 
become relevant to potential international prosecution in which a perpetrator has surrendered and 
submitted to the terms of an amnesty legislation.39  Potential mitigating factors for perpetrators 
include participation in the acts of mercy and assistance to victims,40 public expression of 
remorse and contrition,41 voluntary surrender,42 and cooperation with the Prosecutor.43
However, ad hoc tribunals also considered aggravating factors to a sentence, such as overall 
gravity of the crime, willingness of participation, membership in extreme organizations, degree 
of suffering and harm caused to victims, means of killing, crimes that victimize civilians or the 
young, and the perpetrator’s leadership position.44
B.  The Ugandan Amnesty Act of 2000
In order to encourage LRA combatants to abandon the insurgency, Uganda passed the 
Amnesty Act45 on January 21, 2000, which led to over 15,000 amnesty grants to surrendering 
combatants who had engaged in armed rebellion against the government since 1986 and who 
agreed to renounce and abandon the insurgency.46 With a broad mandate to promote 
6reconciliation, the Act suggested the possibility of instituting a truth-seeking justice 
mechanism.47
Although many foot soldiers – primarily abducted children -- defected, critics viewed the 
amnesty as a failure because it did not lead to the surrender of LRA leadership or result in the 
end of the conflict.48  The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights called for a renunciation 
of amnesty for LRA leadership accused of serious crimes such as murder, enslavement, torture, 
rape, and sexual slavery.49  In its referral to the ICC, Uganda decided to pursue the 
Commissioner’s policy and withdrew its offer of amnesty to those high-ranking LRA leaders 
whom the Prosecutor had indicted.50
Based on reports that government combatants, the United Peoples’ Defence Forces 
(“UPDF”), committed serious crimes against the civilian population, outside observers criticized 
Uganda’s referral to the ICC for political selectivity.51 However, in its referral, Museveni agreed 
to allow the ICC to investigate and prosecute UPDF officials and combatants.52
C. The Rome Statute
With respect to national amnesties, the Rome Statute is textually silent and open to 
interpretation.53  The preamble of the Rome Statute appears hostile to amnesties for crimes listed 
in the Statute54 while later provisions, notably Article 53, appear to provide the scope for
sophisticated, well-tailored amnesty programs.55
1. Article 17
Article 17 of the Rome Statute regulates issues of admissibility for the Court.56
Specifically, it represents the important principle of “complementarity” – that individual states 
have the first opportunity to prosecute offenders in their jurisdiction.57 The most salient 
provision to non-prosecutorial situations, Article 17(1)(b) sets strict requirements for the Court to 
7recognize alternative judicial proceedings, requiring the state to have investigated the case,
decided not to prosecute, and that its decision did not result “from the unwillingness or inability
of the State genuinely to prosecute.”58 Article 17(2)(a) provides guidance for interpreting the 
“unwillingness” exception of 17(1)(b), allowing admissibility where domestic proceedings are 
“made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.”59
2. Article 53
Article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute allows the Prosecutor to decline prosecution when: 
“[taking] into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice.”60
Thus the Prosecutor has discretion not to initiate an investigation if it would be inconsistent with 
the “interests of justice.”61 Experts disagree as to whether the existence of an amnesty program 
would fit within the parameters of prosecutorial discretion in the “interests of justice.”62
The ICC Prosecutor also must consider the “interest of victims” when making judgments 
of who and when to prosecute.63  The relevance of both the “interests of justice” and the 
“interests of victims” reflects an emerging new order that international justice must engage both 
victims and perpetrators.64  A recent cooperative survey of victims in northern Uganda found 
that, in order to accept amnesty grantees back into the community, a majority of those 
surveyed(56%) would require an apology, while a significant percentage (34%) would demand 
confession.65  This information, revealing the true “interests of the victims,” could be factored 
into the Prosecutor’s consideration of potential prosecutorial targets.66
Article 53(2)(c) compels the Prosecutor to consider the “gravity of the crime.”67  Human 
Rights Watch has suggested certain considerations to measure gravity of the crimes: the amount 
of premeditation, the extent of the crimes, the number of victims, suffering of the victims, and 
8the heinous means of the crimes.68 Article 53(2)(c) also requires the ICC Prosecutor to “[take] 
into account the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator,” ostensibly creating an exception 
for children, elderly, and drug-influenced combatants.69
II.  Analysis
The potential conflict between the Ugandan Amnesty Act and the Rome Statute will 
likely prove challenging for the Court to decide by simple black-letter legal analysis.70 Both 
Article 17 and Article 53 indicate that the Prosecutor and the ICC must interpret justice 
broadly.71 In particular, the broad language of Article 53(2)(c) appears to require policy 
analysis, effectively allowing, or indeed instructing, the Prosecutor to consider the consequences 
of investigative and prosecutorial choices.72  However, it could be argued that Article 17 limits 
this prosecutorial discretion since Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) allow the Prosecutor to consider 
Article 17 inadmissibility criteria in deciding whether to investigate or prosecute a case.73
A. Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Pass the 
Complementarity Requirement of Article 17
While flexibility to find a case inadmissible under Article 17 is limited,74 the Court could 
nevertheless consider well-tailored alternative approaches that meet strict requirements.75
Therefore, only national amnesties that are individually investigative, conditional, and 
potentially prosecutorial could conceivably pass the complementarity requirement of Article 
17.76 Although the Amnesty Act clearly falls far short of this requirement,77 an analysis of its 
shortcomings illuminates how a post-conflict state under amnesty legislation can structure an
amnesty program/truth commission to potentially satisfy the complementarity requirement of 
Article 17.
91. Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Meet the Complementarity 
Requirements of Article 17 Because it Does Not Provide for Individual 
Investigations
The plain language of Article 17(1)(b), allowing the Court to find a case inadmissible
when “[t]he case has been investigated by a State,” implies that the Court can  only defer to 
amnesties when there has been an individual investigation into the facts of a case.78 Robust 
investigations may also refute an “unwillingness” determination under Article 17(2)(a) that the 
decision was made to shield offenders from criminal responsibility as it suggests that amnesty 
seekers are individually taking responsibility for their actions.79  An issue open to debate, 
however, is whether the Court will interpret “investigation,” as a conventional criminal 
investigation, or adopt a broader approach, and read “investigation” to include good-faith, 
methodical evidence-gathering.80 Uganda’s amnesty program would certainly fail both standards 
because it does not provide for any inquiry consistent with typical criminal investigations.81
2. Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Meet the Complementarity 
Requirements of Article 17 Because it is Not Conditional
Article 17(2)(a) instructs the Court to determine “unwillingness,” and find a case 
admissible if it appears that purpose of the national proceedings, or the decision not to prosecute, 
is to “[shield] the person concerned from criminal responsibility.”82  This provision seems to 
require conditionality; an amnesty grant contingent on the applicant providing something of 
community value, as in a “compelling state interest” such as full confession, apology, or 
financial restitution, may counter contentions of intentional protection of the offender.83
Accordingly, Uganda’s Amnesty Act would fall short of Article 17’s admissibility test because 
its principal requirement is a pre- existing legal duty – ceasing hostilities.84 Since the amnesty 
should remain contingent on the particularities of each state,85 a valid Ugandan amnesty program 
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would require a community benefit based on Ugandans’ stated opinions, such as confessing 
wrongdoing or apologizing.86
3. Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Meet the  Complementarity 
Requirements  of Article 17 Because it is Not Potentially Prosecutorial
Article 17(1)(b)’s post-investigation requirement that “a State has decided not to 
prosecute” suggests that there must be a prosecutorial option available to the decision-maker to 
meet the complementarity regime.87 Accordingly, Uganda’s Amnesty Act fails this requirement 
because it lacks any prosecutorial mechanism to adjudicate putative amnesty seekers in criminal 
proceedings.88 One may attempt to characterize amnesty legislation as a “decision” not to 
prosecute under Article 17(1)(b).89  However, even if the Court were to deem the Amnesty Act a 
“decision” for Article 17 purposes, it may find it nevertheless fails the complementarity 
requirement of Article 17(1)(b) because it resulted from an “inability” to prosecute, since the 
legislation effectively barred prosecution.90  Furthermore, the Court could also find the Ugandan 
amnesty “decision” admissible because the Act was a decision based on an “unwillingness” of 
the Ugandan government to install genuine criminal trials, in that its stated purpose of peace and 
reconciliation could only be accomplished by shielding offenders from criminal responsibility.91
B. Article 17 Expressly Limits the 
Prosecutor to All but the Most Serious Offenses
A general policy of respecting truth commission amnesties, except for a small number of 
the most serious cases, would be consistent with the mandate of Article 17 and Article 53 for the 
Court and the Prosecutor to consider the “gravity of the crime.”92 The Preamble of the Rome 
Statute declares that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished.”93  While emphasizing the imperative to prosecute the most 
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serious crimes, this provision also provides further scope for prosecutorial discretion in 
considering the gravity of the crime.94
Because prosecutorial resources are sparse in Uganda, and the number of atrocities are so 
numerous, significant discretion within the Ugandan judicial system seems inevitable.95
Furthermore, consideration of the gravity of the offense provides flexibility to prosecute those 
who played major roles in recruiting child soldiers, a grave offense indeed given the great 
number of children abducted by the LRA.96 In practice, with Kony’s cult-like control over the 
rebels and the terror-induced but tenuous participation of forcibly-recruited child soldiers, 
isolating LRA’ top leaders through arrest may result in a quick collapse of the rebel group.97
There is much debate whether to require international accountability under the Rome 
Statute for perpetrators who capitulated pursuant to amnesty legislation, or to a future truth 
commission amnesty.98 Critically, the value of amnesties would diminish if the Prosecutor could 
prosecute even those perpetrators to whom a truth commission had already granted amnesty.99
Accordingly, with the exception of offenders of serious international crimes, selecting cases to 
prosecute among those that have either failed to apply for amnesty or those whose amnesty 
applications have been rejected would be consistent with the Rome Statute and would preserve 
the integrity of amnesty programs.100
Some experts who believe that accommodating amnesties may in fact aggravate enduring
peace have suggested that the international community's amnesty grant to Turkish officials 
accused of planning massacres of Armenians during World War I tacitly emboldened Adolf 
Hitler to engineer the Holocaust with impunity.101  However, if a comparable gross violation of 
human rights like the Holocaust were to occur today, Article 17’s mandate for ICC prosecution 
of those most responsible for the gravest of crimes would preclude any immunity of high-level 
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officials and preserve the vital deterrent effect.102  Thus, this argument fails to fully appreciate 
the flexible reach of the Rome Statute and its ability to accommodate both justice and peace 
concerns.103
C. A General Policy of Respecting 
Amnesties Would Serve the “Interests of Justice”
The Rome Statute appears to foreclose the possibility that unconditional amnesties should 
bar ICC prosecution of perpetrators of serious crimes.104 However, Article 53 gives the Court 
and the Prosecutor flexibility to defer prosecution to uphold the “interests of justice.”105
Specifically, Article 53 links justice principles to specific parameters, including the “gravity of 
the crime,” the “interests of victims,” and the “age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator.”  
Accordingly, justice, and the possibility of ICC prosecution, must be bound to case-related 
considerations.106
Justice and amnesty can act as complementary, mutually reinforcing forces.107
Conditional amnesties provide incentive for both victims108 – who will likely be attracted to the 
prospect of receiving financial consideration – and perpetrators109 – who seek to avoid 
prosecution – to reconcile.  Amnesties founded upon reconciliatory principles and featuring 
restorative mechanisms, such as South Africa’s TRC amnesty program, can promote justice by 
redressing a balance through the vindication and restoration of victims.110 Conversely, 
prosecution is necessary to make the threat of punishment credible, and encourages combatants 
to apply for amnesty.111 In Uganda, where the LRA will be the subject to most investigations, 
honoring amnesties given to LRA combatants would likely bear reconciliatory benefits by 
rendering the process less one-sided.112
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The “interests of justice” calculus of Article 53 may also provide scope to for the 
Prosecutor to consider practical limitations in post-conflict states.113 Although the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone opined that no amnesty grant should bar 
prosecution for international crimes,114 due to the limited resources of the Special Court, some 
argued that the Prosecutor gave it virtual de facto approval.115 The Special Court, in its
declarations on core principles of customary international law, may have underestimated
practical constraints in transitional states.116 This paradoxical result certainly will be relevant to 
the ICC’s investigation and possible prosecution in Uganda, which will be hampered by similar 
logistical and financial limitations.117
D. A Ugandan Complementary Truth Commission Would Serve 
Both the “Interest of Justice” and the “Interests of the Victims”
As stated above, it would be difficult for a truth commission procedure to satisfy the 
complementary requirements of Article 17.118 At first glance, Article 17’s strict test suggests 
that a case before a truth commission will likely remain admissible before the ICC.119 Indeed, 
the Court may find a case admissible even if the state has investigated and decided not to 
prosecute, as long as it meets the “unwillingness” requirement of Article 17(2).120 However, it is 
possible that a well-tailored truth commission with similar characteristics to a criminal trial may 
allow the Prosecutor to find the case inadmissible.121
If the Court finds a case has failed the complementarity requirements of Article 17, the 
state could nevertheless argue that prosecutorial discretion, under the broader “interests of 
justice” analysis of Article 53(2)(c), should preclude ICC prosecution.122 In Uganda, alternative 
justice proponents may maintain, truth commissions can further strengthen the “interests of the 
victims” of Uganda’s civil war.123 Thus, Article 53 is the most significant mechanism whereby 
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the Prosecutor could accord deference to alternative reconciliation measures in Uganda, or 
another post-conflict state.124
Ideally, truth commissions serve the “interests of the victims” because they reduce the 
likelihood of provoking offenders into resuming hostilities in the future.125 Further, it is often 
only through accounts of the war crime perpetrators themselves that families of victims can 
determine the circumstances and location of their loved ones’ deaths.126 Indeed, the prospect of
conditional amnesty within a truth commission encourages both surrender and confession.127  A
system of predominantly criminal trials, in contrast, may have a disempowering effect on victims 
when such trials deny them an opportunity to tell their complete story.128
A truth commission may also serve the “interests of victims” by complementing the 
prosecutorial mechanisms of the ICC and Ugandan judicial system to create a symbiotic 
collaborative framework.129 A system in which trials are reserved only for serious crimes, 
allowing truth commissions to settle most disputes, provides accountability for past abuses while 
also creating a historical record to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated in the future.130
Finally, a truth commission would be especially crucial to the “interests of justice” in 
Uganda, where the number of child soldiers is overwhelming, by providing an appropriate forum 
in which to resolve cases involving child combatants.131  Article 53(2)(c) appears to instruct the 
ICC prosecutor to use caution when considering prosecution of young and drug-influenced 
combatants.132 Prosecuting children and infirm combatants, even if they have committed serious 
crimes, may be contrary to the “interests of justice,” and thus outside the reach of ICC 
prosecution.133
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E. ICC Rules of Procedure and Recent International Practice Suggest that the 
ICC Has the Authority to Consider Sentence Mitigation for Amnesty Holders
Consideration of an offender’s surrender to a legitimate amnesty program as a mitigating 
sentencing factor provides an appropriate compromise between peace and justice necessities and 
is consistent with the ICC’s founding principles.134 The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
includes the sentencing factor of “subsequent conduct” of the perpetrator.135  Thus, even the
capitulation of perpetrators of international crimes pursuant to an amnesty agreement would 
seem to warrant judicial consideration of sentence mitigation in order to encourage other serious 
offenders to surrender.136
The practices of recent ad hoc courts further supports the legitimacy of mitigating 
sentences for perpetrators that surrender or otherwise cooperate with the prosecution by 
accepting an amnesty’s terms.137 However, when aggravating circumstances are sufficiently 
compelling, they may outweigh mitigating factors.138  This balancing test presents difficulties in 
Uganda, as those LRA members whose surrender is most vital to peace likely have severe 
aggravating factors, given the appalling nature of the crimes, the undeniable suffering inflicted 
on victims, and their high positions of authority in the LRA.139  Accordingly, the incentive to 
surrender under an amnesty deal would evaporate if high-level perpetrators were to face the risk 
of unmitigated, or indeed aggravated, post-capitulation sentencing.140
III.  Recommendations
The ICC Prosecutor’s task of balancing the demands of justice and peace during an on-
going conflict, within the scope of an ambiguous statute, will not be easy.141  The most 
promising solution will hinge on a three-pronged prosecutorial approach involving the ICC, 
meaningful national prosecutions, and truth commissions.142 Beyond offenders who have 
16
committed a grave international crime, the Ugandan judicial system should select cases from 
individuals who failed to apply for amnesty or those amnesty applicants whose application a 
Ugandan truth commission or court has rejected.143
A. Uganda and the ICC Must Collaborate to 
Create an Integrated and Effective Criminal Justice System 
First, the ICC must prosecute, amnesty or not, those perpetrators of the most serious 
international crimes,144 absent special circumstances.145 Criminal punishment is especially 
critical for those most responsible for serious international crimes, in order to honor the victims, 
uphold fundamental values of accountability, and deter potential ringleaders elsewhere.146
Second, because a lack of resources will limit ICC prosecutions to only a few of the most 
egregious offenders, it is critical that the Ugandan government pursue lesser violations by both 
LRA and UPDF offenders.147  Unlike South Africa, the Ugandan government must vigorously 
prosecute those who failed to seek, or those who were denied, amnesty.148  Finally, the 
international community must provide financial support, in the form of donations, as well as
logistical assistance, to ensure that Uganda has adequate resources to bring all serious 
perpetrators to justice.149
B. Uganda Must Create an Amnesty-Granting
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The Ugandan government should institute a truth commission with the power to grant 
amnesties.150  Further, it should require perpetrators who voluntarily surrender under an amnesty 
grant to appear at such a truth commission.151 The truth commissions, however, must not be 
mere smokescreens that shield wrongdoers from prosecution. 152 Due to the concern that 
allowing a truth commission to pass evidence collected in the course of its own work to the ICC 
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may discourage cooperation, the ICC Prosecutor should prohibit the use of such evidence for the 
indictment of alleged perpetrators.153  Lastly, in order to avoid an “unwillingness” determination 
under Article 17(2)(c), Uganda must ensure that the truth commissions are composed of an 
impartial, independent, and diverse group of Ugandans, thus including Acholi leaders.154
C. Uganda Should Create an Amnesty 
Program Which Would Satisfy Article 17’s Complementarity Requirements 
In order to institute an amnesty program that meets the complementarity requirements of 
Article 17, Uganda must ensure that it is individualized, which will be crucial to counter the 
perception that only the LRA were guilty of crimes and allow accountability for UPDF 
soldiers.155  Second, consistent with the TRC model, amnesty should be conditional, so that the 
amnesty seeker must pay for his forgiveness in a manner according with the will of the local 
community.156  This would localize the reconciliation process and empower local Ugandans by 
offering an opportunity to name the price of their own forgiveness.157  Based on a recent survey, 
the truth commission should strongly consider requiring perpetrators to confess, apologize, and 
provide restitution to victims, if possible.158 Finally, the truth commission must reserve the 
option of referring any case to either the ICC or Ugandan national courts if the offender does not 
satisfactorily fulfill the amnesty requirements.159
D. The ICC and the Ugandan Judicial System Must 
Exercise Discretion when Prosecuting Children
Due to children’s undeveloped concept of intent and awareness, providing justice in cases 
of child soldiers demands a different prosecutorial paradigm.160 First, for those children under 
eighteen, the ICC should encourage hearings in separate juvenile chambers or truth commission 
proceedings.161 Given the staggering percentage of children in LRA’s forces, settling cases 
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involving children in truth commissions would significantly alleviate the strain on Uganda’s 
criminal justice system.162  Second, the Prosecutor should assign a specialist in children's rights 
issues to investigate crimes of child recruitment.163  Lastly, amnesty grants must not foreclose 
prosecution of those whom the Prosecutor suspects of recruiting child soldiers, which would
send a potent message to other regimes that seek children as combatants that such practice is 
intolerable to the international community.164
E. The ICC Should Allow Mitigated 
Sentences For Those Perpetrators that 
Surrender by Complying with the Demands of the Amnesty
Finally, to encourage a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the Court should consider
mitigating sentences for perpetrators of even the most serious crimes.165  To preserve the 
necessary incentive of an amnesty deal and reduce uncertainty as to the result of surrender, the 
ICC should give substantial weight to the mitigating factor of voluntary surrender , in addition to
other aggravating and mitigating factors.166  Further, the ICC must improve and clarify its 
message to local communities, including the LRA, so all Ugandans are aware  of the rewards of 
reconciliation and amnesty, as well as the extent of amnesty coverage.167  Without such 
information, insurgent combatants may hesitate to surrender if they fear that they would still be 
susceptible to prosecution.168
Conclusion
Although amnesties are generally a political tool for quelling conflicts, with the passage 
of the Rome Statute, they now must pass more rigid international legal muster.169  The Statute 
instructs the Prosecutor and the Court to strike a balance between the restorative needs of 
transitional societies and international demands of criminal prosecution.170 Accordingly, the ICC 
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must proceed with caution before eroding the value of national amnesties.171 Ugandans and ICC 
officers now have the opportunity to create a future template for an effective dual approach in
post-conflict states, combining threats of ICC prosecution with a peace-building national 
amnesty program.172 The ICC’s determination of the Prosecutor’s reach in Uganda will shape 
the practical workings of the Rome Statute in relation to national amnesties, and carry powerful
precedent in future ICC cases.173
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66 See Rome Statue, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c) (stating that there may be no basis for prosecution 
if the Prosecutor finds that such prosecution is not in the “interests of the victims”); see also
Forgotten Voices, supra note 9, at 39-40 (concluding that most affected people of northern 
Uganda had immediate needs for peace and food, did not regard peace and justice as mutually 
exclusive, and favored some form of accountability for LRA members responsible for atrocities).
67 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c) (mandating that the Prosecutor consider certain 
circumstances, including the gravity of crime, in assessing the “interests of justice” for a 
potential prosecution).
68 See Policy Paper, supra note 61, at 16-17 (incorporating case law from the ICTR and ICTY in 
the context of evaluating crimes for sentencing purposes).  
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69 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Policy Paper, supra note 61, at 17 
(proposing mitigating factors for sentencing: (1) “the young age of the accused”; (2) “the poor 
health of the accused”; and (3) “the advanced age of the accused”).
70 See discussion supra Part II; see also Arsanjani, supra note 4, at 65 (observing that these 
conflicts are more real than theoretical, involving "fundamental question[s] of policy with far-
reaching implications for the international human rights program and the maintenance of public 
order”).
71 See Stahn, supra note 55, at 698 (arguing that the express distinction in the language of Article 
53(2)(c) – based on “all the circumstances, including” –  suggests that the “interests of justice” 
may provide for a broad concept of justice, allowing a departure from traditional prosecution).
72 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2) (mandating the ICC Prosecutor, in determining what 
perpetrator to sue, consider the “interests of justice,” “all the circumstances,” “the gravity of the 
crime,” and “the interests of the victims”); see also Arsanjani, supra note 4, at 66 (noting that 
legal experts cannot analyze the jurisdiction of the ICC by mere legal analysis as such questions 
involve fundamental policy issues with salient implications for human rights efforts, and local 
politics).
73 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(1)(b), (c) (instructing the Prosecutor to consider 
whether the case would be admissible under Article 17 when determining whether to initiate an 
investigation or prosecution); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 717 (arguing that due to Article 17 
constraints, Article 53’s allowance of broad prosecutorial discretion is in fact not as broad as 
many believe).
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74 See Stahn, supra note 55, at 709 (introducing two limiting elements of Article 17:  an initial 
presumption in favor of admissibility, and a high threshold for inadmissibility for cases in which 
admissibility is in question).  
75 See Robinson, supra note 57, at 502 (noting that for the Court to allow alternative methods of 
justice, the procedure must be qualitatively similar to genuine prosecution).
76 See Stahn, supra note 55, at 711-12 (arguing that a state could satisfy Article 17 
complementarity requirements when alternative justice forums can recommend prosecution 
following proceedings, while reserving the authority to deny amnesties after a complete factual 
investigation).  
77 See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (granting immunity to all perpetrators, without requiring 
offenders to state their crime or performing investigative function).
78 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 710 (observing 
that the underlying principle of Article 17 is that amnesties must be accompanied by some 
inquiry mechanisms into the crime of the putative offender).  
79 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b), 17(2)(a); see also Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, 
Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers:  Reconciliation in Transitional Societies, 35 Colum. 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 661, 721 (2004) (noting that individual amnesties are more likely to 
overcome suspicions of impunity).
80 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b); see also Robinson, supra note 57, at 500 
(remarking that an interpretation of “investigation” to be a criminal investigation would only 
allow deference to truth and reconciliation efforts under the “interests of justice” analysis of 
Article 53); Stahn, supra note 55, at 711 (arguing that a broader reading of Article 17 would 
likely allow truth and reconciliation programs in the mold of the South African TRC, in which a 
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commission may absolve an offender only if it conditioned exemption from criminal 
responsibility upon testimony as to the facts of the crime and the offender’s own conduct).
81 See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (merely requiring an amnesty seeker to report to the 
authorities, renounce involvement in the hostilities, and surrender weapons); see also Robinson, 
supra note 57, at 500 (maintaining that the Court could find a valid investigation when it is based 
on certain criteria, such as sufficiency of evidence, seriousness of the conduct, and role of the 
perpetrator).
82 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(a); see also Sarkin, supra note 79, at 709 (asserting 
that in order to meet the high threshold of inadmissibility, a state must satisfy Article 17(b)’s 
strict conditions).
83 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(a); see also Arsanjani, supra note 4, at 66 
(contending that conditional amnesty enforces the perception of amnesty as a contract – valid 
only to the extent that both parties comply with its terms); Sarkin, supra note 79, at 721 
(remarking that only conditional amnesties, in which a state exchanges its discretion to punish 
for a compelling state interest, will sufficiently link the non-punishment of crimes and 
democracy); Stahn, supra note 55, at 714 (remarking that a Peruvian amnesty law which barred 
investigation and prosecution of members of its military forces would likely not meet the Article 
17(2)(a) requirement because it infers a state’s intent to “shield” from criminal responsibility).  
Some experts maintain that Article 17(1)(b)’s mandate that a state, in order to satisfy 
complementarity, “decided” not to prosecute also implies that amnesty grants must be 
conditional upon the completion of a specific procedure, allowing the decision maker to 
determine if the offender has met certain criteria to be exempted from criminal responsibility. 
See Stahn, supra note 55, at 712.
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84 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17; see also Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (granting 
immunity in exchange for the amnesty seeker’s surrender and renouncement of the rebellion); 
Sarkin, supra note 79, at 721 (arguing that a state should not grant amnesty for nothing, or in 
return for a pre-existing legal duty, like obeying the law).
85 See TRC Report, supra note 32, vol. 6, § 1, ch. 5, ¶ 1 (remarking that the South African largely 
successful amnesty process was not blanket but conditional, requiring that offenders publicly 
declare human rights violations before they could receive an amnesty grant); see also Stahn, 
supra note 55, at 721 (remarking that as each state’s circumstances and conditions will be 
unique, the country should determine on its own compelling state interests).
86 See Forgotten Voices, supra note 9, at 29 (finding that 56% of Ugandans would require 
apologies from amnestied individuals, while 34% would demand that the perpetrator confess to 
their wrongdoing before accepting them back into the community).
87 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b); see also Robinson, supra note 57, at 500 
(observing that it would be inaccurate to deem a prosecution barred by legislation as a “decision” 
not to prosecute); Stahn, supra note 55, at 711-23 (observing that alternative forums of justice 
with the power to recommend judicial prosecution and deny amnesties after the completion of a 
investigative procedure would likely meet the requirements of the Article 17(2)).
88 See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (permitting the Minister to give a Certification of 
Amnesty without any investigative mechanisms into the facts of the offender’s crimes).
89 See Robinson, supra note 57, at 501 (observing that even if one called a legislative amnesty as 
a “decision,” it would be difficult to refute the fact that the state’s intent was to shield 
perpetrators).
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90 See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (prohibiting prosecution or “any form of punishment” of 
those offenders who sought, and were granted, amnesty).
91 See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pmbl. (declaring that it is the desire of the government to 
implement its amnesty policy in order to “establish peace, security, and tranquility throughout 
the country”); see also Robinson, supra note 57, at 501 (remarking that even if one characterized 
the principal intent of an amnesty program as to promote reconciliation, the means of such an act 
are certainly, at least in large part, to shield perpetrators).
92 See Rome Statue, supra note 3, arts. 17(1)(d), 53(2)(c); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 707 
(asserting that since the “gravity of the crime” is a guiding factor in both the admissibility test of 
Article 17(1)(d) and the Prosecutor’s assessment to investigate and prosecute under Article 53, 
there is room to differentiate between more serious and less serious crimes).
93 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
94 See Stahn, supra note 55, at 708 (setting forth the limitations to international criminal 
prosecution in the ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
95 See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 8 (describing the insufficient resources of the 
Ugandan legal system, including understaffed courts, inexperienced judges, the dearth of 
qualified lawyers in Gulu, and the prohibitive costs of private litigation).  But see Akhavan, 
supra note 52, at 415 (observing that Uganda still possesses a viable and independent judicial 
system).
96 See Rome Statue, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c).
97 See Akhavan, supra note 52, at 420 (noting the immediate tangible consequences of the ICC’s 
threats of prosecution to the top LRA leadership). 
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98 See Ssenyonjo, supra note 8, at 427 (remarking that if the ICC were to take precedence over 
Ugandan national laws, even amnesty grantees could be subject to ICC prosecution, rendering 
the Amnesty Act ineffectual).
99 See Roche, supra note 53, at 574 (noting that perpetrators who are aware that any admission 
could become the basis of an ICC prosecution may gain an additional incentive to forsake an 
amnesty and continue fighting).
100 See id. (suggesting that withholding prosecuting to perpetrators who have already been 
granted amnesty would make amnesties more valuable, solidifying the amnesties’ value); see
also Ssenyonjo, supra note 8, at 427 (recommending that the ICC, given its mandate of ending 
impunity of perpetrators of international crimes, must bring to justice LRA’s top officers who are 
responsible for committing the gravest crimes).
101 See Scharf, supra note 19, at 188 (arguing that the failure to prosecute the Armenian massacre 
sent a message to the Nazis that they could effectively get away with genocidal policies).
102See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17. 
103See id. art. 53(1)(c) (mandating the Prosecutor to consider the “gravity of the crime” in 
determining whether to initiate an investigation); see also Clark, supra note 17, at 389 (stating 
that the ICC is determined to end impunity for perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity by requiring the Prosecutor to take cases even when states are reluctant to do so 
on their own).
104 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 718 (arguing 
that the Court will likely determine that validation of an automatic amnesty for the most serious 
perpetrators is contrary to the purpose of the Rome Statue).
41
105 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53; see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 717 (stating the 
principle of Article 17 is that there must be unusual circumstances to defer investigations or 
prosecutions).
106 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(c); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 718 
(concluding that it is unlikely that drafters of the Rome Statute intended Article 53 to allow  
general consideration of national reconciliation or peacemaking goals).
107 See Sarkin, supra note 79, at 691-92 (positing that reconciliation enhances justice insofar as 
authentic reconciliation allows similar results as does punitive justice – vindication and 
restitution); see also Erin Daly, Transformative Justice:  Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 
Int’l Legal Persp. 73, 133 (2002) (observing that since justice requires truth and truth requires 
the promise of amnesty, amnesty is indeed an essential part of justice).
108 See Roche, supra note 53, at 578 (noting that one of the principal factors encouraging 
apartheid victims to seek justice within the South African TRC was the prospect of financial 
reparation).
109 See Daly, supra note 107, at 132 (explaining South Africa’s Constitutional Court’s reasoning 
for upholding the TRC’s amnesty provision: offenders are given the necessary incentive to come 
forward with the truth, which victims seek so desperately, with the knowledge that they will be 
immune from punishment).
110 See Sarkin, supra note 79, at 692 (stating that broader notions of justice and reconciliation can 
lead to healing, both on a societal and individual level).
111 See Daly, supra note 109, at 133 (pointing out that offenders would have no incentive to 
apply for amnesty without the specter of criminal prosecution, as evidenced by perpetrators who 
abstained from amnesty in South Africa).  
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112 See Sarkin, supra note 79, at 694 (observing that prosecutorial discretion would benefit 
reconciliation in a post-conflict state where the judicial system would prosecute members of only 
group).
113 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c) (ordering the Prosecutor to consider “all the 
circumstances” when deciding whether prosecuting a case would be “in the interests of justice”).
114 See Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-
AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, ¶ 71 (Mar. 13, 2004) 
(maintaining that states may not grant amnesty for crimes of international jurisdiction).
115 See id. ¶ 59 (relating the Defense’s argument that the Prosecutor may have offered de facto 
immunity to some individuals who allegedly committed similar crimes as the defendants as a 
result of their cooperation with the Prosecutor); see also Schabas, supra note 36, at 166 
(observing that the Special Court’s modest budget, temporal restrictions to acts committed after 
November of 1996, and limited jurisdiction against those that “bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations,” suggested that the United Nations was effectively encouraging amnesty for 
the majority of perpetrators).
116 See Schabas, supra note 36, at 166 (remarking that in a conflict in which thousands of 
individuals were likely guilty of committing inhumane acts, the difference between the position 
of the United Nations and that manifested in the Lomé Agreement amounted to only several 
individuals).
117 See generally Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 7-11 (describing the limited judicial 
resources of northern Uganda, including understaffed courts, lack of police presence, and 
shortage of qualified lawyers).
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118 See Robinson, supra note 57, at 505 (noting that in order for an alternative procedure to meet 
the complementarity test, it would have to be a sophisticated procedure with certain prosecutorial 
features).
119 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(a),(b); see also Roche, supra note 53, at 568 
(observing that even if the ICC finds that a truth commission is an investigation, it does not 
necessarily constitute a formal prosecution). 
120 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2) (ordering the Court, in determining unwillingness, 
to consider whether one or more of the following factors are present:  the proceedings were 
undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility,” 
there was an “unjustified delay in the proceedings,” or the proceedings were not “conducted 
independently or impartially”).
121 See Stahn, supra note 55, at 710 (interpreting Article 17’s clauses foreclosing prosecution 
where “the case has been investigated by a State...and the State has decided not to prosecute the 
person concerned” as perhaps providing room for inadmissibility when a truth commission has 
investigated a crime or where criminal proceedings lead to symbolic punishment); see Roche, 
supra note 53, at 568 (maintaining that truth commissions are not based on an “unwillingness” to 
prosecute because their purpose, it can be argued, is to promote the restorative concept of justice 
through the uncovering of the truth and reconciliatory necessities).  But see Dugard, supra note 3, 
at 702 (arguing that it is difficult to argue that a state’s decision to forego prosecution and grant 
amnesty after an investigation did not result from prosecutorial “unwillingness” when the state in 
fact decided not to prosecute).
122 See Roche, supra note 53, at 568-69 (remarking that given the formidable challenges facing 
post-conflict societies, states who choose to institute a truth commission may decide to exchange 
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some retributive justice – at least to those offenders to whom a judicial body has granted 
legitimate amnesty – in order to promote other important objectives, including “uncovering the 
truth, assisting victims, and promoting reconciliation and reconstruction”).
123 See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 18, at 364 (explaining that the TRC’s narrative process 
"gave victims a chance to relate their suffering, thus providing them with the specific 
acknowledgment and vindication they had long been denied and in most cases, with cathartic and 
psychologically beneficial effects”). But see Policy Paper, supra note 61, at 19 (arguing that the 
ICC must only consider the victims’ interests as they relate to the purposes of Article 53 –
including determining the identities of the perpetrators, hearing the perpetrator’s explanation,
and seeing perpetrators punished).
124 See Robinson, supra note 57, at 505 (explaining that exceptional circumstances may render a 
rigid prosecutorial approach harmful to the local community).
125 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 1995, pmbl. (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Reconciliation Act] (providing that one 
purpose of the amnesty grant is to make recommendations to prevent future offenses against 
human rights); Roche, supra note 53, at 574 (observing that the success of South Africa’s TRC 
illustrates that amnesties can provide enduring peace if a truth commission administers them 
properly).  Further, truth commissions ensure that the “parallel truths” of perpetrators are 
addressed and corrected, helping to understand the cognitive process of the tragedy and to 
correct misconceptions in public discourse for future generations.  Id. at 571.
126 See Reconciliation Act, supra note 125, pmbl.( relating the Grant’s intent to “promote 
rehabilitation and restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of human rights 
violations”); see also Goldstein-Bloom, supra note 18, at 364 (stating the TRC collected 
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testimonies from about 24,000 victims of human rights abuses, thereby creating a social truth as 
to the circumstances and impact of the abuses); Roche, supra note 53, at 571 (explaining that 
perpetrators tend to dispose of evidence of their crime, including often burying bodies in mass 
graves). 
127 See TRC report, supra note 32, vol. 6, § 1, ch. 5, ¶ 37 (maintaining that “the amnesty process 
made a meaningful contribution to a better understanding of the causes, nature, and extent of the 
conflict... [allowing] unique insight into the perspectives and motives of those who committed 
gross violations of human rights”); see also Roche, supra note 53, at 571 (noting that testimony 
of offenders was crucial to the success of South Africa’s TRC investigation, helping to identify 
secret burial sites, conduct exhumations, and provide dignified reburials); Sarkin, supra note 79, 
at 721 (maintaining that participation in a truth and reconciliation process symbolizes the 
perpetrator’s willingness to play a role in the new order).
128 See Daly, supra note 32, at 106 (remarking that criminal prosecution is unlikely to 
successfully deter in post-conflict societies because it does not address the causes of the crimes 
and because trials only address the leaders of the prior regime, without attempting to change the 
society as a whole to one that does not tolerate such crimes); see also Goldstein-Bloom, supra
note 18, at 360 (noting that granting justice-making ability solely to lawyers and administrators 
may leave victims unsatisfied). 
129 See Roche, supra note 53, at 575 (proposing that a truth commission “could assist the ICC by 
passing on any evidence it collected in the course of its own work”).
130 See Stafford, supra note 22, at 136 (relating that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
the Lomé Peace Agreement was critical in providing a restorative forum for victims and 
perpetrators to complement the Special Court)
46
131 See Singer, supra note 8, at 580 (relating that Sierra Leone placed children accused of grave 
crimes in special closed juvenile hearings and provided counseling and other assistance).
132 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c) (ordering the Prosecutor to consider “the age or 
infirmity of the alleged perpetrator” when deciding if there is a sufficient basis for prosecution); 
see also UNHCHR Report, supra note 49 (recognizing that since the overwhelming majority of 
LRA fighters are, or used to be child soldiers, it is unlikely that the Prosecutor would prosecute 
for crimes they committed while they were under abduction).
133 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Statute for the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone art. 7(1), Jan. 16, 2000, U.N. Doc. 5/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html (last visited June 29, 2006) (declaring that the Special Court “shall have no 
jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission 
of the crime”).  Further, the Statue instructed the Court to treat alleged perpetrators who were 
fifteen to eighteen at the time of the crime with dignity to assist in their reintegration in society.  
Id.
134 See Dugard, supra note 3, at 703 (remarking that allowing sentence mitigation would preserve 
the integrity of the ICC, which seeks to promote accountability for the commission of 
international crimes).
135 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-
ASP/1/3, Rule 145(2)(a) (2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/
officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (last visited March 5, 2006) (listing 
non-exhaustive mitigating factors including “conduct after the act,” “efforts to compensate the 
victim” and “cooperation with the Court”).
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136 See Akhavan, supra note 52, at 418 (proposing that the ICC could offer mitigated sentencing 
to top LRA members, in the highly unlikely event they are willing to capitulate); see also Stahn, 
supra note 55, at 718 (proposing that while cooperation with a truth commission would not be a 
determinative factor in whether to prosecute, it should be a mitigating sentencing factor). 
137 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 21 (Mar. 5, 
1998) (ruling that the defendant’s voluntary surrender was a mitigating factor due to the 
important need to encourage other perpetrators to come forward).
138 See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Sentence, ¶ 473 (Dec. 6, 1999) (holding 
that the defendant’s high position, knowledge, and conscious participation in crimes outweighed 
mitigating factors including his assistance to certain individuals and his poor health); see also
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 62 (Sept. 4, 1998) 
(ruling that the defendant’s aggravating circumstances, including his high ministerial post, 
offsets his cooperation with the Prosecutor and his guilty plea).
139 See Arrest Warrant, supra note 14 (describing the charges against the LRA’s top leaders, 
including rape, murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement, forced enlisting of children). 
140 See David Blair, I Killed So Many I Lost Count, Says Boy, 11, Thousands of Children Have 
Been Taken By a Ugandan Cult and Forced to Join in Mass Murder.  Now the Net is Closing on 
the Fanatic Responsible, Daily Telegraph, Aug. 3, 2005, at 12 (observing that although in 
theory, Uganda’s amnesty grant would apply to Kony, an ICC arrest warrant would relinquish 
the grant, thus deterring Kony from surrendering).
141 See discussion supra Part I.A.3 (setting forth mitigating and aggravating sentencing factors 
developed by the ICTR and ICTY).
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142 See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 15 (calling for a broader truth-seeking process to 
supplement ICC investigation, in order to investigate crimes not within ICC jurisdiction); see
also Roche, supra note 53, at 579 (proposing a cooperative approach in future cases in which the 
ICC would prosecute perpetrators who fail to satisfy the conditions of a truth commission 
amnesty grant).
143 See Roche, supra note 53, at 574 (arguing that this approach would thereafter make amnesties 
more valuable and encourage offenders to seek amnesty).
144 See Arrest Warrants, supra note 14 (declaring that the Prosecutor’s mandate is to investigate 
and prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes).
145 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c)(instructing the Prosecutor to consider the 
“interests of justice” and the “interests of justice” when making prosecutorial decisions); see also
Robinson, supra note 57, at 495 (noting that many advocates for prosecuting all offenders of 
international crimes concede a possible exception where insistence on prosecution would trigger 
additional hostilities).
146 See Robinson, supra note 57, at 495 (remarking that granting amnesty to architects of mass 
atrocities would be especially problematic).
147 See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 13 (recommending that the Ugandan judicial 
system prosecute perpetrators of both Ugandan and international law, including crimes 
committed prior to Uganda’s ratification of the Rome Statute in July 2002); see also Stahn, supra
note 55 (suggesting that Article 17 seems to prohibit amnesty grants which exempt certain 
governmental forces from prosecution).  
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148 See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 18, at 365-66 (maintaining that although many criticized 
the TRC for its failure to provide adequate reparation to apartheid victims by letting those 
responsible for crimes escape with impunity, this underscored the weaknesses of the South 
African legal system rather than the TRC amnesty program). 
149 See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 11 (recommending that international donors 
should support, in the form of earmarked funds, the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, a 
national judicial body that investigates and hears individual cases against the government army 
that is currently under-funded and understaffed); see also Eric Stover & Marieke Wierda, 
...[W]hich Should Prevail, Int’l Herald Tribune, Oct. 15, 2005 available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/14/opinion/
ed/stover.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (observing that financial and logistical international 
support would allow Uganda’s criminal justice system to try perpetrators for serious crimes not 
covered by ICC indictments). 
150 See Roche, supra note 53, at 575 (remarking that individual sanction of amnesty from a truth 
commission is vital to the legitimacy of the amnesty program).
151 See id. at 576 (noting that a state would only be able to argue for an ICC prosecution bar in
cases where a truth commission grants amnesties individually based on strict, transparent 
criteria).
152 See id. at 575 (commenting that, under a cooperative approach, the ICC would need to be 
certain that the truth commission adequately fostered truth, reparation, and reconciliation 
interests).
153 See id. (discussing the policy of the Prosecutor for the Special Court of Sierra Leone -- to 
encourage all parties to go before the truth commission and tell their story without fear of 
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reprisal but reserving the power to indict the witness through information that the commission 
did not compel the witness to provide); see also TRC Report, supra note 32, vol. 6, § 1, ch. 1 
(declaring that the TRC amnesty applicant was protected against disclosure or her amnesty 
application in subsequent criminal proceedings and the prosecution was barred from using facts 
from the application).
154 See Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 17(2)(c) (mandating that the ICC, in determining 
unwillingness of a state to prosecute, shall consider whether the state did not conduct the 
proceedings “independently or impartially”); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 713 (noting that 
“[q]uasi-judicial mechanisms should be…. sufficiently independent of the state and sufficiently 
impartial in their decision-making process, in order to be recognized as forums of justice barring 
proceedings before the Court”).
155 See Daly, supra note 32, at 389 (explaining that individual amnesty was vital in the Rwandan 
case due to misconceptions that all perpetrators of genocide were Hutu).
156 See Roche, supra note 53, at 576 (observing that an unconditional blanket amnesty would be 
illegal, and would remain susceptible to ICC prosecution); see also Forgotten Voices, supra note 
9, at 29 (finding that only four percent of Ugandan polled respondents would support an 
unconditional amnesty before the community accepts the perpetrator back into the community).
157 See Forgotten Voices, supra note 9, at 29 (listing survey participants’ proposed requirements 
in exchange for granting amnesty to perpetrators, including apologizing (56%), confessing 
wrongdoing (34%), and subjecting themselves to trial (13%)).
158 See id. at 37 (finding that 52% of Ugandans believe the perpetrator should provide food to 
victims, and 40% would require food as compensation).  Further investigation of appropriate 
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restitution would be helpful to assist a truth and reconciliation commission determine the fairest 
price for amnesty according to Ugandans themselves.  Id. at 6.
159 See Stahn, supra note 55, at 712 (observing that Article 17(1)(b)’s inadmissibility requirement 
that the case must have resulted in a “decision” of a state not to prosecute suggests that the 
drafters intended a person to be exempt from criminal responsibility only after meeting certain 
specified criteria). 
160See Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7(1), Jan. 16, 2000, U.N. Doc. 
5/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html (last visited June 29, 2006) 
(prohibiting the Court from trying alleged perpetrators under 15 and requiring discretion for 
those who were fifteen to eighteen at the time of the alleged crime); see also Singer, supra note 8, 
at 580 (stating that the goal of deterrence is diminished where, due to the child’s age and duress 
by threats and drugs, there is less awareness).
161 See id. (describing the strategy of the Sierra Leone Special Court in which the Court allowed 
hearings for children accused of particularly heinous crimes in closed juvenile chambers, and 
provided psychological counseling and other forms of assistance).
162 See Ssenyonjo, supra note 8, at 411-12 (observing that over eighty-five percent of LRA’s 
forces are made up of children).
163 See Jo Becker, Children as Weapons of War, Human Rights Watch World Report (2004), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/
11.htm (last visited June 29, 2006) (relating that the most active effort at pursuing children 
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